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Divorce Lawyers New York - Recent Family Law Decisons (59)

RECENT FAMILY LAW DECISIONS (59)

Standing
A child may not bring suit against his father to recover arrearages in child support payments.
A minor child, by his grandmother as next friend, cannot compel the father to pay to the child arrearages in child support.

Temporary Cessation of Income
Where the record amply demonstrated that defendant’s request for reduction of child support payments was not prompted by a desire to evade his responsibility, and the order of the trial judge did not relieve defendant of all responsibility for child support for the period in question; the defendant’s temporary cessation of income, incurred voluntarily, but in good faith, prompted the trial judge, in the exercise of judgment and discretion, to enter the question order; there was no abuse of that discretion.

Termination
Term in martial settlement agreement providing that child support ended when the child graduated from high school was interpreted to mean that child support also ended when the child earned general education development certificate before high school graduation.

In General
The general rule is that child support terminates when the child reaches majority.
A father may not decide when and for what reason he will discontinue child support; that decision is within the sole province of the court.
The court has clear statutory authority, in the proper case, to terminate child support.
A mere violation of visitation terms by the mother will not excuse the father’s obligation to support his children.

Discretion of Court
A court cannot order termination of support for a child before the legal duty of support ends.

Mandatory Termination
The terminating events contained in subsection (b) are mandatory.

Not Allowed
The circumstances of the case could not be considered as extraordinary as to permit defendant’s support of his son to have been terminated before the son reached majority.
Where the trial court employed the statutory definition of majority (formerly Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 3, para. 131), which became effective subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree in arriving at its conclusion that a male child ceases to be a minor at age 18, but the statute in effect on the date of the entry of the decree provided that males attained majority at age 21; the trial court’s determination that plaintiff’s son, upon reaching 18 years of age on June 14, 1973, was no longer entitled to support under the terms of the divorce decree was erroneous.

 

 

 

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