Operation of Property
The fact that only one spouse operated most of the disputed property was not dispositive; the statute is clear on its face that so long as it was acquired during the marriage and did not fall within the enumerated exceptions, it was marital property. In re Dietz
Partnership Interest
The trial court abused its discretion in equitably dividing marital assets where it neglected to consider husband’s partnership interest as a valuable marital asset, failed to consider assets used to retire business debts as dissipated assets, and allowed the husband to deduct amounts used to repay marital debts from his personal income for purposes of calculating his child support obligation. In re Hart
Pensions
When an early retirement incentive enhances pension benefits, to the extent that such enhancements are derivative of the right to receive the pension as deferred compensation, the proportion of the enhancement that is marital property is exactly the same as the proportion of the pension as a whole that is marital; in the unusual case where the entitlement to such enhancements is not purely derivative, however, that portion of the enhancement not derived from the right to receive the pension itself is the pensioner’s sole property. Because early retirement incentives come in a multitude of forms, the decision concerning the most equitable method of apportionment in the circumstances present in a case may not be the most equitable or logical method in all cases where this problem arises; therefore, trial courts must not always apportion partially derivative pension enhancements through requiring reimbursements. In re Marriage of Ramsey
Marital property includes pensions that accrue during a marriage. Brackett v. Brackett
Personal Injury Settlement
Trial court’s inclusion of husband’s personal injury settlement as part of marital estate was proper. In re Pace
There was no abuse of discretion in the award to wife of $220,000 of $1.8 million personal injury settlement received by husband for injuries which resulted in total paralysis from the chest down; as a spouse she did suffer but husband would live with the paralysis for the remainder of his life while she leaves the marriage the same way she entered it; an employed, healthy, able-bodied person. In re Murphy
Where petitioner accrued cause of action for personal injuries after filing his petition for dissolution of marriage but prior to the final order dividing the marital property, the trial court properly classified the proceeds of the cause of action as marital property. In re Burt
Damages incurred for pain and suffering arising from a cause of action which accrued during the marriage are marital property and the court should consider the division of the damages under subsection (d) of this section, which allows the court to consider the disability of an injured spouse and, if appropriate, award a larger portion of the marital property to the injured spouse. In re Burt
The entirety of a cause of action for personal injuries, including potential damages for pain, suffering and disability, is marital property. In re Burt
Since a personal injury settlement does not fit within any of the exceptions to marital property enumerated in this Act, the presumption that a personal injury settlement was marital property as provided in subsection (b) of this section applied, and the settlement proceeds were properly deemed marital property. In re Gan
The proceeds of a personal injury settlement, properly declared to be marital property, were subject to disposition along with other marital property, pursuant to the provisions of subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section. In re Gan
