Where petitioner had sufficient resources for which to pay her attorney and there was no indication that such payment would strip the petitioner of her means of support or undermine her financial stability, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring each party to pay its own attorney’s fees.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring defendant to pay a portion of plaintiff’s attorney fees incurred in connection with several post-decree proceedings.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to plaintiff, since plaintiff was not required to exhaust her estate to protect her rights in the marital litigation, and where she was financially unable to pay the fees but defendant was able to do so.
A plaintiff’s contention that the court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay the defendant’s attorney’s fees of $5,000 within 90 days of the entry of the supplemental judgment for divorce was without merit since additional time was not required to make the payment.
In light of former husband’s ability to absorb some of the legal costs of divorce, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding former wife $2,000 in attorney fees.
Where custodial modification appeared to have been sought primarily for the convenience of the parties rather than as a means of properly presenting the needs of the children to the court, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s petition for attorney fees.
The well-established principle that the amount of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be interfered with unless abused, applies to support awards.
The allowance of attorney fees in a divorce proceeding is not automatic, but depends on a showing that one spouse is financially unable to pay the fees, while the other is able to do so.
The decisions whether to grant periodic alimony, attorney fees, and suit money rest in the sound discretion of the circuit court.
The matter of fixing attorney fees is one of the few areas in which a trial judge may rely on the pleadings, affidavits on file and on his own experience.
Former section 15 of the Divorce Act authorized the trial court to order the payment of such attorney fees as may seem equitable, regardless of the disposition of the case.
The awarding of attorney fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be interfered with unless such discretion is clearly abused.
Ability to Pay
In General
The trial court did not err in requiring ex-wife to pay a majority of her attorney fees.
For purposes of determining an award of attorney fees, financial inability exists where the forced payment of available funds would strip a person of his or her means of support and undermine his or her economic stability.
The party seeking attorney fees must show an inability to pay, and the ability of the other spouse to pay fees.
Before one spouse may recover attorney fees from the other, the spouse seeking fees must demonstrate that he or she is financially unable to pay and that the other spouse has the ability to pay; a mere showing that the other spouse has a greater ability to pay attorney fees is not sufficient to justify an award of fees under this section.
Under subdivision (a)(5) a court need not determine the ability or inability of a party to pay the requested fees.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that reasonable fees for representation in post-dissolution proceedings were $445 where petitioner admitted that the nature of the controversy was relatively simple, that the case presented no novel or difficult question, and that there was no important family law issue involved.
Considering the respective financial resources of the parties, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring respondent to pay $10,000 for petitioner’s attorney fees.
Where a wife’s $9,000 in attorney fees amounted to approximately double her annual gross earnings, where she did not own any income-producing assets, and where her husband’s ability to pay attorney fees was considerably greater than that of the wife’s, the award of attorney fees to the wife was not an abuse of discretion.
There was no abuse of discretion in requiring that respondent pay $1,200 towards petitioner’s reasonable attorney fees where petitioner’s income and assets were minimal while those of respondent were substantial.
Where petitioner was unable on a relative basis to pay all of her own attorney fees without depleting her capital assets, the trial court’s conclusion that respondent should pay $3,500 of petitioner’s attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion.
After considering the financial resources of the parties, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion to award attorney fees.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees to wife on the basis that there was no evidence of husband’s assets, his past income, or his current income, other than his testimony that wile recovering from an operation he was only receiving income of $475 per month from a partnership.
Where the parties’ income was substantially unequal, but the wife received more marital property capable of producing income in the near future, and the husband was required to pay a substantial part of the wife’s fees, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award wife attorney fees.
One spouse’s earlier part-time employment and probationary employment at the time of hearing did not provide a sufficient basis upon which to find equality in earning power with that of her husband, a college graduate employed by the same company since 1967 with steady increases in compensation, such that the trial court’s award of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring husband to pay a portion of wife’s attorney fees where it could have reasonably concluded that the husband had the ability to pay and that the respondent wife did not have the ability to pay that portion of the fees.
Award of attorney fees to former wife was consistent with the weight of the evidence and not an abuse of the court’s discretion.
In view of respondent’s income and his obligations under the property division, the trial court’s award of $500 in attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion.
The circuit court’s order that respondent pay two-thirds of petitioner’s attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion, even though petitioner had the ability to pay the entire amount of her fees out of her bank accounts and stock.
Trial court’s determination that the plaintiff was unable to pay all of her attorneys’ fees was not palpably erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
Where each party had approximately $100 left after the payment of its monthly expenses, and where petitioner’s obligations were comparably greater and included, in addition to his own attorney fees, payment of the child’s attorney fees, the trial court’s denial of attorney fees to respondent was not an abuse of discretion.
It was not an abuse of discretion to not require the husband to contribute to the wife’s attorney fees as the wife failed to show an inability to pay her own attorney fees.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the wife payment for her attorney fees, despite allegations that the vast majority of her expenses were caused by the husband’s lack of cooperation, where the wife’s earned income was greater than the husband’s, the husband’s financial circumstances were not so mush better than the wife’s that he should have been required to pay the wife’s attorneys fees, and the expenses were unreasonable considering the nature of the proceedings and the limited monetary resources of the parties.
Where the trial court properly considered all of the attendant facts and acted reasonably under the circumstances, the award of attorney fees was not erroneous.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring each party to pay its own attorney fees, based on the parties’ financial circumstances and the parties’ unwillingness to compromise.
Where petitioner’s job paid only $14,000 a year with no benefits, she estimated that it would cost $1,700 a month to care for herself and her child, and conversely, respondent earned $47,000 a year and in addition had his own business which had generated as much as $15,000 a year, it was not an abuse of discretion to order respondent to pay petitioner’s attorney fees.
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that attorney fees for matters unrelated to the dissolution proceedings were recoverable under subsection (a) it would be an extreme waste of judicial time to require an attorney seeking the payment of fees to file a separate action requesting payment for those services, especially given his testimony that some of his time reflected conferences involving the material, partially marital, and nonmarital property.
Where the evidence presented showed that wife’s attorney fees were in excess of $20,000 and that husband had the ability to absorb the fees in view of the significant disparity in incomes between the parties led to a holding that the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the wife was not an abuse of discretion.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering wife to pay $2,000 out of $4,082 of husband’s attorney fees where husband’s expenses exceeded his income, where his present liquid assets were likely to be used to offset the difference, and where the record clearly demonstrated that the wife possessed the ability to pay the $2,000 attorney fee award.
Trial court’s order directing husband to pay attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion where the evidence indicated that requiring the wife to pay the attorney fees would undermine her economic stability and where the record indicated that the husband was able to pay the fees.
The court did not abuse its discretion where it awarded attorney fees to wife, even though the cause of action was unsuccessful.
Where, prior to hearing on fees, wife and other persons in her behalf paid attorney $5,725, of which $2,000 apparently was for post-judgment matters relating to the case but not a part of the billings reflected by the evidence, there was evidence that she had the ability to pay her fees, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney fees.
Where the record lacked any evidentiary support for a final award of fees, and where neither the amount of attorney fees nor the reasonableness of charges was submitted for the trial court’s consideration, there was no abuse of the trial court’s denial of fees.
Just who is the better custodial parent? Most parents would think that he or she is clearly the better custodial parent. But who does the court consider to be the best? Well, that all depends upon the interest of the child and not the interest of the parents. But just what is the interest of the child and how is it determined? Although the formula and guidelines exist, it is up to each individual judge to make that ultimate decision. To see a list of factors that the court will look at when determining custody and to determine the court’s view of the Best Interest of Child, visit the informative article at http://www.divorce-lawyers-newyork.com/best_interest_of_child_doc.php
Although a complete termination of alimony to the plaintiff was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, the continued payment of $16,000 a year to a woman of the plaintiff’s means, after her brief marriage to the defendant, was not justified. Borowitz v. Borowitz
The trial court did not err in its judgment that plaintiff, by using the $1,000 in additional payments awarded to her as a condition to termination of alimony, could make herself employable either by undergoing surgery on her feet or by obtaining additional education, and that defendant’s remarriage, and the birth of a child from the new marriage, constituted substantial change of circumstances justifying termination of alimony. Tan v. Tan
Similar prior provision allowing the court to make reasonable and proper alterations in its alimony requirement also vested the court with ample power to declare the termination of all alimony upon the occurrence of facts reasonable justifying such a declaration. Lennahan v. O’Keefe
Absent unequivocal language that the court intended a spouse’s heirs to be bound by its alimony obligation terminated at paying spouse’s death. Lennahan v. O’Keefe
ELIZABETH, N.J. - With no sign of a settlement in the highly public divorce of New Jersey’s gay ex-governor, onlookers can expect more dirt to be kicked up in the week ahead.
Jim and Dina Matos McGreevey are each expected to take a turn on the witness stand this week as a judge tries to figure out how much the governor-turned-seminary-student should pay in alimony and child support.
The Garden State’s infamous former first couple has already done a thorough job of dragging each other through the mud as they decouple.
Following his famed “I am a gay American” resignation speech, which propelled the McGreeveys onto a national stage in 2004, the pair has been engaged in a lengthy public humiliation battle that seems unlikely to end soon.
It was unnecessary for the court to make any findings as to matters on the economic circumstances of the parties since the date the judgment of dissolution was entered where the record reflected that following the remand order no extraordinary circumstances had arisen.
Despite overwhelming odds, Allison Quets is not done fighting for the twins she gave up and then abducted. Legal experts say the two main issues that would have allowed her to see the twins, Holly and Tyler, have been decided. But Quets clings to the hope that someday a court will rule in her favor. “Sooner or later, we’re going to find the right court and the right judge,” Quets said in a recent interview, “and I know this will be rectified.” For more than two years, Quets has been in a bitter custody dispute with the twins’ adoptive parents, Kevin and Denise Needham of Apex. The Needhams couldn’t be reached for comment, but a family friend, Kat Moncol, said Quets’ quest is futile. “After she kidnapped the children, she doesn’t have a chance to see them at all,” Moncol said. “It was totally inappropriate.”
A bill proposing that regional magistrate’s courts be allowed to grant divorces would create formidable challenges, given problems with fraudulent decrees, MPs heard on Monday. This was the view of the Judicial Officers Association of SA (JOASA) in its submission to the national assembly’s justice committee. It said each regional court would need the equivalent of a registrar equipped and skilled to deal with divorce matters. ‘It will be difficult to institute divorce proceedings in these courts’ “There have been many fraudulent divorce decrees and a central registrar functions efficiently to control this,” the submission states. To impose the duties of divorce court registrars on current civil clerks at the various courts would be highly impractical, it warned.
Douglas County commissioners took the first step Wednesday to hand back responsibility for enforcing local child support orders to the state of Oregon. The commissioners signed a notice notifying the state that the county plans to close its child support unit beginning July 1. Under terms of an operating agreement with the state, the county is required to provide 90 days notice to end the agreement. Earlier, District Attorney Jack Banta signed a similar notice. The District Attorney’s Office is also a party to the agreement and needed to notify the state. The five county employees who work for the child support unit will become state employees after the transfer. They are guaranteed work at the same salary for the first year they are employed by the state. “The state statute is clear that the employees can go with the job,” County Attorney Paul Meyer said. The county and state will negotiate how to handle accrued vacation time, comp time and sick leave. The county may pay the employees for some of their accrued time or the state may allow them to carry over those hours. Either way, the employees themselves will not lose any money by making the move. The District Attorney’s Office estimated it could save $100,000 a year by having the state Department of Justice enforce the child support orders. Parents will still be able to seek help in enforcing such orders, but they may have to deal with a case worker based in a city outside Douglas County.
Ten new faces of parents accused of not paying court-ordered child support will soon grace the walls of local businesses. The Butler County Child Support Enforcement Agency released a new wanted poster Thursday, March 20. Individuals on the poster owe a combined $223,000 in back child support. Everyone listed on the poster has eluded attempts to collect child support and has a pending arrest warrant, CSEA officials say. “It takes a lot to get on this poster,” said CSEA Director Cynthia Brown. “We are asking the public to help bring these offenders to justice.” Agency officials say they have located 136 featured parents and collected more than $1.3 million in back payment since the first poster was published in 1995.
Illinois; dividing property during the divorce.Who gets what?Illinois refers to asses and debts as marital property, and during the divorce process they do what is called just proportions when dividing the property.Marital property is what is gathered together during the marriage, and then is split as equally as possible or as the divorce courts see fit to do so.Not all property in Illinois is considered to be marital property, so what are the things they will not consider to be marital property in the divorce?Here is a list.
Assets and property that you had before you were married, these are things they will not make you split in a divorce process, unless you have what they call commingled the property and assets together with marital property.Then there is a chance it can be split evenly in the divorce process.
If there is a separate income that is produced from an investment you had before you were married and all the income from it has been kept separate from marital bank accounts, again it has been kept separate and not been commingled with anything brought in together during the marriage.
It is always important even if you think you will never get divorced, to just keep separate assets, property and income separate from your joint accounts.If only this could be explained before it happens, but it is important to keep documents of everything you have.Those can save you in a divorce process along with all receipts and documents.So when the divorce courts are dividing property in a divorce, here are some of the factors they look at to determine who gets what in the divorce.
How long the marriage was, under 5 years or over 5 years?
All the material and the non material property there is to be gone through and split in the divorce.
The financial potential or how much the spouse is earning now, where they can go and if they can make more money.
The health and the age of each spouse is looked at in the divorce.
Which property was gained by which spouse in the marriage, basically who confirms they acquired the property.
How either spouse will benefit from the property in the divorce?
If there was other marriages, and if there are obligations to that family.
Any signed or agreements made during the marriage.
Also if there will be any tax consequences in the divorce.
No divorce is easy, no matter what anybody says, it helps to know what your doing and to have answers to your questions.Illinois Dividing Property. - Divorce
ABILITY TO PAY Courts always consider a person’s ability to pay when setting his alimony obligation. A court looks at the payer’s gross income from all sources (wages, public benefits, interest and dividends on investments, rents from real property, profits from patents and the like, and any other sources of income), less any mandatory deductions (income taxes, Social Security, health care and mandatory union dues). The result is the payer’s net income. In most states, deductions for credit union payments and wage attachments are not subtracted when calculating net income. Thus, if John makes $2,000 per month, and income tax, Social Security, unemployment insurance benefits and other government deductions reduce his income to $1,500, this is his net income. The fact that $300 more is withheld to pay a credit union loan does not further reduce his net income for the court’s purposes. The reason for this rule is that the law accords support payments a higher priority than other types of debts, and would rather see other debts not paid than have a spouse go without adequate support.
The courts have no authority over non – marital property. So, the first thing the court has to do is determine whether they have authority over property. Generally speaking, all property acquired by either spouse before the marriage is considered non – marital property. All property acquired after the marriage is considered property of the marriage or marital property. If the property is marital property then the court must “equitably” divide the property.
GETTING divorced can be traumatic enough, but losing assets rightfully yours could make things even worse. But many people are unaware that unless they apply for a property settlement within 12 months of their divorce, they risk losing their assets, said family law specialist with Watts MacCray, Jackie Vincent. Even those who are just separated are at risk, she said.”In a famous case from 2000, a legally married but separated spouse won the lottery,” she said. “His wife was still able to make a claim on these assets because she was still married to him and they had never done a legal property settlement. She was awarded almost $1 million.”A property settlement application divides the assets and financial resources of a marriage, she said, including the family home, furniture, vehicles and investments. It also takes in superannuation, which is treated like any other marital asset after the Family Law Act was amended in 2002.Debt is also considered a marital asset in some cases, said Ms Vincent. “A mortgage is a shared debt,” she said. “Even if the debts are in only one name, if they are there to support the family - such as a personal loan to buy a car or furniture - then it’s a shared debt.”
As Good Friday approaches, I would like you all to reflect on the words of the Rev Roger Smith, who wrote the following impassioned plea to parishioners some years ago in an Easter newsletter: “The truth is that children can put up with most things - drunkenness, violence, illness, etc - but the one thing they cannot survive is their parents’ divorce. Divorce causes children to fail at school, to become drug addicts, to become criminals. We hear a lot about child abusers these days. My view is that, when a judge issues a divorce decree where children are involved, both parents should be investigated for child abuse - not physical, but mental and spiritual.
